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ABSTRACT 
Why has Vietnam, an authoritarian state, pursued a generally collaborative and 
transparent policy of emerging infectious disease surveillance and reporting during the 
last two decades? This thesis seeks to add both depth and breadth to this puzzle by 
analyzing Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting during SARS, H5N1, H1N1, and 
COVID-19 against the theory of complex interdependence as the causal agent. Despite an 
exception during its initial H5N1 outbreak, Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting during 
these case studies have been largely consistent in sharing epidemiological information 
and integrating international entities into the structure of this effort. Additionally, 
this behavior has accompanied the country’s deepening integration into the broader 
global economic and political order. Ultimately, Vietnam’s transparency and 
international cooperativeness during these four emerging infectious disease 
outbreaks show consistency with the internationally enmeshed tenets of complex 
interdependence. These findings also suggest that the country’s deliberate effort to 
develop as a highly integrated global actor, rather than the authoritarian nature of its 
government, is largely determinant in driving its contemporary emerging infectious 
disease surveillance and reporting. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................3 
1. International Norms ......................................................................4 
2. Domestic Issues...............................................................................7 
3. Converging Domestic and International Interests ......................8 
B. THESIS OVERVIEW ...............................................................................9 
II. SARS: THE INITIAL MANIFESTATION OF GLOBAL 
INTEGRATION ...................................................................................................11 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................11 
B. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................11 
C. A “NEW WORLD” VIEW: THE ROAD TO VIETNAM’S 
SARS RESPONSE ...................................................................................14 
D. THE MULTIPLE CHANNELS OF VIETNAM’S 
SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING DURING SARS ....................16 
E. THE CHINESE COUNTERPOINT TO VIETNAM’S 
SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING .................................................18 
III. H5N1: STRIKING DEVIATION OR SUSTAINED COOPERATION? .......21 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................21 
B. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................21 
C. VIETNAM’S H5N1 COVER-UP AND THE HIERARCHY OF 
ISSUES ......................................................................................................24 
D. OTHER H5N1 DEFECTORS AND THE FALLACY OF 
AUTHORITARIAN COVER-UP...........................................................27 




B. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................31 
C. THE H1N1 RESPONSE: RIDING THE WAVE OF 
INTERNATIONAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESPONSE ...............33 
D. VIETNAM’S SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING DURING 
H1N1: SIMPLY FOLLOWING THE NORM? ....................................36 
V. COVID-19: BUILDING INTERNATIONAL STANDING THROUGH 
SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING .............................................................39 
viii 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................39 
B. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................39 
C. TRANSPARENCY AND THE CAPACITY BUILDING OF 
THE POST H1N1 ERA ...........................................................................42 
D. THE TWO-WAY STREET OF COMPLEX 
INTERDEPENDENCE ...........................................................................44 
E. TRANSPARENCY AS A SOURCE OF PERFORMANCE 
LEGITIMACY .........................................................................................46 
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................49 
A. SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING IN REVIEW: AN 
OUTPUT OF INTERNATIONAL ENMESHMENT ...........................49 
B. VIETNAM AND THE AUTHORITARIANISM (MIS)LABEL .........50 
C. COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE AND BLENDED 
FOREIGN POLICY ................................................................................53 
D. IMPLICATIONS: SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING IN A 
GLOBALIZED WORLD ........................................................................55 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................59 




LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
APSED Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases and Public Health 
Emergencies 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019 
DAH Department of Animal Health 
GHSA Global Health Security Agenda 
GISN Global Influenza Surveillance Network 
GOARN Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network 
HTD Hospital for Tropical Diseases 
IHR 2005 International Health Regulations 
JEE Joint Evaluation Exercise 
MARD  Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
MBDS Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance  
MERS Middle East Respiratory Syndrome 
MOH Ministry of Health 
NIHE National Institute for Hygiene and Epidemiology 
OIE World Organization for Animal Health 
OUCRU Oxford University Clinical Research Unit 
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
SEARO South-East Asia Regional Office 
VCP Vietnamese Communist Party 
WHO World Health Organization 
WPRO Western Pacific Regional Office 
x 




I would like to thank my thesis advisors, Dr. Robert Weiner and Dr. Tristan Mabry, 
for their exceptional guidance and mentorship in enabling the completion of this academic 
undertaking. Your timely feedback and thoughtful dialogue were invaluable in pushing me 
to continually refine my research and analysis of what I believe is a fascinating and truly 
relevant topic. 
I would also like to acknowledge my fellow NPS students for the engagement, 
insight, and friendship you afforded me during fifteen months of online classes due to the 
pandemic conditions of COVID-19. There were many days where you represented my only 
form of social interaction and intellectual stimulation, even if only through the digital 
format of a Zoom classroom. May we learn from this uniquely challenging period so that 
others will not have to repeat it.  
  
xii 




Why has Vietnam, an authoritarian state, pursued a generally collaborative and 
transparent policy of emerging infectious disease surveillance and reporting during the last 
two decades? Investigating the underpinnings behind Vietnam’s internationally 
cooperative approach is significant because it challenges the assertion that “authoritarian 
countries are often reluctant to admit health crises because of the threat such an admission 
could have on state control over society.”1 Additionally, Vietnam’s surveillance and 
reporting approaches cannot simply be explained along the lines of purportedly 
authoritarian tendencies to conceal failures, broadcast (or propagandize) successes, or 
withhold information writ large from the international community. Highlighting exceptions 
to this behavior and identifying the motivations behind such deviations to an otherwise 
sustained pattern are also helpful in deepening an understanding of when Vietnam, or 
another contemporary, could potentially be expected to pursue such a course of action. 
Furthermore, examining the impetus for the country’s chosen approach to emerging 
infectious disease surveillance and reporting over the span of three decades of political 
change affords an opportunity to better “discern continuity and change in the forms and 
substance of authoritarianism.”2 Finally, while the relationship between transparency and 
overall infectious disease response effectiveness is not necessarily the focus of this 
research, it can be explored indirectly by examining the outcomes of a country’s overall 
response strategy (of which surveillance and reporting forms a key element).  
This thesis seeks to add both depth and breadth to this puzzle by analyzing 
Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting during SARS, H5N1, H1N1, and COVID-19 
outbreaks against the theory of complex interdependence as the causal agent. During each 
of these episodes, the country pursued a response that was highly dependent on 
international assistance and involvement. Despite an exception during the initial H5N1 
 
1 Daniel W. Drezner, Theories of International Politics and Zombies, Revived Edition, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015: 60. 
2 Jonathan London, “Viet Nam and the Making of Market-Leninism,” Pacific Review 22, no. 3 (2009): 
376, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740903068404. 
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outbreak, Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting during these case studies was largely 
transparent in either sharing epidemiological information or integrating international 
entities into the structure of this effort. Vietnam’s experiences with these emerging 
infectious disease outbreaks occurred in the midst of an era in which the country has 
remained under the authoritarian control of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) while 
undergoing significant economic and political changes. It has been argued that with the 
advent of Doi Moi liberalization, Vietnam abandoned a foreign policy based on Realist 
assumptions and “firmly embraced the principles of complex interdependence and 
integration into the global economy.”3 In that vein, this thesis seeks to ascertain if a policy 
of internationalized information sharing during emerging infectious disease outbreaks may 
best be explained by a paradigm shift to complex interdependence in which “Vietnam 
wants to get involved in as many international organizations and regional bodies as 
possible.”4  
Infectious disease surveillance and reporting has been characterized as dependent 
on two key elements: state capacity and political will.5 Although capacity can certainly 
present a very real limitation in a country’s ability to detect and share information during 
a disease outbreak, capacity has a greatly diminished role in the utility of surveillance and 
reporting if political will has determined to throttle the flow of information, especially to 
the global community. Examining Vietnam’s emerging infectious disease surveillance and 
reporting provides a deeper understanding of the outputs produced by an increasingly 
competitive form of authoritarian rule in which state capacity has increased along with the 
political will required to exercise it. 
This thesis finds that, overall, Vietnam has demonstrated a general pattern of 
willingness to act as a timely and transparent reporter across the case studies of SARS, 
H5N1, H1N1, and COVID-19. This behavior has accompanied a broader determination to 
 
3 Zachary Abuza, “International Relations Theory and Vietnam,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 17, 
no. 4 (March 1, 1996): 406, 408. 
4 Abuza, 411. 
5 Sara E. Davies, Adam Kamradt-Scott, and Simon Rushton, Disease Diplomacy: International Norms 
and Global Health Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 112. 
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adhere to international health regulations mandating reporting as well as increasing 
capacity to detect and track emerging infectious disease outbreaks. At the same time, 
Vietnam’s increasing capacity for surveillance has largely been enabled by assistance from 
or direct involvement with international organizations which have, in many ways, 
augmented or even superseded the traditional role of the state in performing such functions. 
This shift has accompanied the country’s deeper international enmeshment, suggesting that 
complex interdependence helps to explain why Vietnam has acted in such a manner. In 
short, Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting has been shaped by a deliberate decision to 
internationally integrate itself along a litany of avenues, resulting in a complex tapestry of 
multiple channels connecting it to the global community. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Infectious disease surveillance and reporting is broadly concerned with the 
collection, analysis, interpretation, and communication of disease-related data.6 Emerging 
infectious diseases, which are characterized as newly recognized in human hosts, new 
locations or reappearing after apparent elimination, pose a uniquely challenging problem 
for any surveillance and reporting regime by virtue of their dynamic and complicated 
nature.7 Beginning with the SARS epidemic in 2003, in which Vietnam received praise 
“for openly and competently controlling the epidemic,” the country has repeatedly been 
characterized as a “good-faith actor in the global public health sphere” in its surveillance 
and reporting of emerging infectious disease outbreaks.8 
In addition to SARS, Vietnam also received praise for its timeliness and 
transparency in its handling of H1N1 and COVID-19. The case study of H5N1, however, 
does provide somewhat of an exception to this approach. For example, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) covered up the initial H5N1 outbreak in 
2003 before the Vietnamese government adopted an overtly publicized policy of 
 
.6 Davies, Kamradt-Scott, and Rushton, 112. 
7 David M. Morens and Anthony S. Fauci, “Emerging Infectious Diseases: Threats to Human Health 
and Global Stability,” PLos Pathog 9, no. 7 (July 2013): 1. 
8 Melissa G. Curley and Jonathan Herington, “The Securitisation of Avian Influenza: International 
Discourses and Domestic Politics in Asia,” Review of International Studies 37, no. 1 (July 2010): 153.  
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highlighting its efforts to contain the virus.9 Even in this case, however, Vietnamese 
officials ultimately “began cooperating with the WHO and international community at the 
point in which the outbreaks became a national (and hence potentially international) 
problem.”10 Thus, even in instances where a deviation has occurred, Vietnam’s approach 
to emerging infectious disease surveillance and reporting still largely reflects themes of 
cooperative international engagement and information sharing with the greater 
international community and key entities such as the World Health Organization (WHO).  
Current scholarship examining why Vietnam (and in some cases, other Southeast 
Asian countries) has adopted a cooperative approach to surveillance and reporting of 
emerging infectious disease outbreaks (or abstained from such behavior) identifies 
dominant drivers which can generally be grouped into broad categories: international and 
domestic. The sections below also reveal that subdivisions within these opposing camps 
differ in their identification of what specific theory provides the best explanation for 
Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting during one or more emerging infectious disease 
episodes. A third body of research offers a more hybrid explanation, establishing the nexus 
of domestic and international interests as the explanation for Vietnam’s surveillance and 
reporting during emerging infectious disease outbreaks over the last two decades. 
Ultimately, while this existing scholarship helps to more broadly illuminate a larger trend 
toward a growing international recognition of infectious disease as a problem without 
borders, it does not fully explain why Vietnam has so vigorously committed to this concept 
in its application of surveillance and reporting despite its seemingly incompatible form  
of government. 
1. International Norms 
Much of the international relations theory-based explanations for Vietnam’s 
emerging infectious disease surveillance and reporting identifies international norms as the 
causal factor for the country’s adoption of a cooperative and transparent approach. The 
 
9 Tuong Vu, “Power, Politics, and Accountability: Vietnam’s Response to Avian Influenza,” in Avian 
Influenza: Science, Policy and Politics, ed. Ian Scoones (London: Earthscan, 2010), 100. 
10 Curley and Herington, 153. 
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World Health Assembly’s adoption of the updated International Health Regulations (IHR 
2005) in May 2005 is often cited as a key event in normalizing timely and transparent 
surveillance and reporting through the establishment of an international health regime for 
global disease surveillance.11 IHR 2005 came into force in 2007 and provided a legal 
framework requiring reporting and risk assessments of public health emergencies of 
international concern.12 The effects of IHR 2005 have been analyzed in the context of how 
Southeast Asian states have complied with reporting compliance of the eight core 
capacities of the regulations, which include surveillance, response, preparedness, and risk 
communication.13 IHR 2005’s normative effects have also been associated with 
participation in evaluations such as the Joint Evaluation Exercise (JEE), “a voluntary 
process that a country requests from the WHO to conduct an external evaluation of its 
public health emergency preparedness and to progress toward IHR core capacities.”14 
Vietnam received its first JEE in late 2016, where it was assessed as having a “high level 
of capacity most apparent in the areas of communication and advocacy as well as real-time 
surveillance.”15 
The norm life cycle model as postulated by Finnemore and Sikkink has also been 
identified as the underlying theory behind Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting.16 In this 
assessment, the formalization of IHR 2005 represented the “norm cascade” phase of the 
cycle, as the norm of timely and transparent reporting of outbreaks had already emerged 
by the early 2000s. The outbreak of SARS in 2003 served as the tipping point in this model 
 
11 Michael G. Baker and David P. Fidler, “Global Public Health Surveillance Under New International 
Health Regulations,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 12, no. 7 (2006): 1058. 
12 David L. Heymann, John S. Mackenzie, and Malik Peiris, “SARS Legacy: Outbreak Reporting Is 
Expected and Respected,” The Lancet (British Edition) 381, no. 9869 (2013): 780, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(13)60185-3. 
13 World Health Organization, Summary of 2011 States Parties Report on IHR Core Capacity 
Implementation, Report No. WHO/HSE/GCR/2012.10 (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2012), 
https://www.who.int/ihr/publications/WHO_HSE_GCR_2012.10eng/en. 
14 Davies, 171. 
15 World Health Organization, Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Viet Nam, Report 
No. WHO/WHE/CPI/2017.21, (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2017), 
https://www.who.int/ihr/publications/WHO-WHE-CPI-2017.21/en. 
16 Davies, Kamradt-Scott, and Rushton, 68. 
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because “states’ perception of the norm of sovereignty, and particularly of its relationship 
to outbreak reporting and response, was rapidly recalibrated during the SARS crisis.”17 
Within Vietnam, “the SARS outbreak, that had occurred just a few months before H5N1 
made its first appearance, made government officials believe more strongly in international 
collaboration on health matters.”18 
While much of the commentary on IHR 2005 and the norm life cycle model 
emphasizes the emergence of norms at the global level, another line of research places 
normative behavior in emerging infectious disease surveillance and reporting at the 
regional level. Created in 2005 by the WHO Western Pacific Regional Office (WPRO) and 
South-East Asia Regional Office (SEARO), the Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging 
Diseases and Public Health Emergencies (APSED) has been credited with shaping 
surveillance and reporting behaviors because it “facilitated regional cooperation that 
pushed Southeast Asian states closer to IHR compliance.”19 Furthermore, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has also been linked to reinforcing the normative 
power of APSED because “in Southeast Asia, state members were participating in APSED 
not only as individual WPRO or SEARO member states but also as ASEAN member states 
cognizant of their political and diplomatic commitments to ASEAN.”20  
Although international norms may indeed be a necessary component for explaining 
why countries have adopted a willingness to report during disease outbreaks, as a 
standalone element they arguably represent an insufficient explanation for the unique 
conditions driving Vietnam to adhere to such norms in the first place. Indeed, the existence 
of these norms has not uniformly resulted in their adherence by both authoritarian and non-
authoritarian states alike. Furthermore, such concepts are not necessarily exclusive of other 
paradigms, such as complex interdependence, which recognize international regimes as 
procedures, rules, or institutions as governing arrangements used to regulate transnational 
 
17 Davies, Kamradt-Scott, and Rushton, 52. 
18 Vu, 119. 
19 Davies, 3. 
20 Davies, 165. 
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and interstate relations.21 Additionally, virtually all of the literature advocating for the 
primacy of norms in shaping state surveillance and reporting behavior during the last two 
decades is largely focused on general trends at the regional or global level. The effects of 
organizations such as APSED will be examined in further detail in Chapter IV, and while 
they certainly help to paint a picture of a broader migrations toward a concept of emerging 
infectious diseases as an inherently international problem, they do not fully account for 
why Vietnam has embraced this approach. Norms may be part of the answer in explaining 
a broader international consensus toward shared interests in infectious disease response, 
but they fail to account for the internal changes that have made the country predisposed 
toward them. 
2. Domestic Issues  
Other existing literature is centered around the premise that “domestic politics and 
economics can easily play a decisive role in whether or not a country declares an infectious 
outbreak” and reports cases in a timely fashion.22 Consequently, domestic issues serve as 
the primary driver regarding surveillance and reporting rather than the idea of international 
expectations suggested by norm proponents. Much of the work advocating this concept 
identifies Vietnam’s initial behavior during the H5N1 outbreak, in which the WHO 
complained that Vietnamese authorities were “slow to report new human cases and 
relatively tight with epidemiological data” as evidence of the centrality of domestic-level 
influences.23 In supporting this argument, the desire to protect the Vietnamese tourism 
industry led the MARD to initially attempt to cover up the emerging outbreak before 
shifting to a policy of deliberate cooperation.24 In these arguments, domestic 
considerations, such as protecting a vital economic sector, constitute overarching reasons 
 
21 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 4th ed. (Boston, Longman, 
2012), 20. 
22 Nicholas Thomas, “The Regionalization of Avian Influenza in East Asia: Responding to the Next 
Pandemic(?),” Asian Survey 46, no. 6 (December 2006): 935, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2006.46.6.917. 
23 Dennis Normile, “Avian Influenza. Vietnam Battles Bird Flu ... and Critics,” Science (American 
Association for the Advancement of Science) 309, no. 5733 (July 15, 2005): 368, 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.309.5733.368. 
24 Vu, 100. 
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why Vietnam did not report in a timely and transparent fashion. Such assertions are also 
more in line with the conventional wisdom expecting ambiguity or some form of cover-up 
from an authoritarian state. 
Domestic pressures have also been identified as the causal factor for Vietnam’s 
shift to a policy of open surveillance and reporting following the initial H5N1 cover-up. 
These arguments highlight the role of the press as “a major actor in determining the timing 
and disclosure of the epidemic’s presence in Vietnam, which had until then been a state 
secret.”25 Empowered by greater autonomy resulting from Doi Moi liberalization, 
reporting by news agencies such as Tuoi Tre became the impetus for state officials to 
deliberately engage in a campaign of transparency with both the domestic population and 
international community.26 The legacy of the Vietnamese press as a “driving force of 
government-issued information and an active partner in the production of norms, practices 
of surveillance and self-regulation” has also been linked to the Vietnamese government’s 
surveillance and reporting strategy for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and initial COVID-19 
outbreak.27 Although the press did not necessarily apply pressure for transparency in these 
later cases, they were instead leveraged by the Vietnamese government as a means of 
demonstrating such behavior to a domestic audience in order to strengthen regime 
legitimacy. 
3. Converging Domestic and International Interests 
A third body of academic work posits that neither international factors such as 
norms nor domestic politics singularly account for Vietnam’s collaborative and transparent 
approach to emerging infectious disease surveillance and reporting. Rather, it is an 
overlapping set of domestic level interests and international prerogatives which have 
generated this response. For instance, supporters of this conclusion specifically draw a 
 
25 Guénel and Klingberg, 268. 
26 Vu, 100. Guénel and Klingberg, 241. 
27 Guénel and Sylvia Klingberg, 239; Le and Huy Quynh Nguyen, “How Vietnam Learned from 
China’s Coronavirus Mistakes”; Viriginia Bacay Watson, “Five Coronavirus Success Stories: Different but 
the Same,” Security Nexus 21 (June 2020): 2, https://apcss.org/nexus_articles/five-coronavirus-success-
stories-different-but-the-same/. 
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different interpretation of Vietnam’s H5N1 surveillance and reporting than their domestic 
politics or norm peers. Through the converging domestic and international interest lens, 
Vietnam’s rapid policy shift during the early stages of this epidemic was two-fold: 
maintaining the support of international public health donors while addressing a serious 
internal threat to the poultry industry within the country.28 
Granted, these arguments do not necessary discount the impact of the forces 
identified by the global health security norm proponents. They are, however, more apt to 
posit that “in the Vietnamese case, pressures from the international sphere coincided with 
core state interests and domestic sources of political legitimacy, such as protecting 
economic growth, and maintaining their reputation as competent managers of health 
emergencies (SARS and H5N1).”29 More broadly, the identification of the nexus of 
domestic and international interests as a dominant causal factor speaks to the idea of a self-
interested state, rather than a regime of global cooperation, as the dominant driver of 
disease response.30 As with norms, these concepts actually fit broadly into the world of 
complex interdependence, in which “many issues arise from what used to considered 
domestic policy, and the distinction between domestic and foreign issues becomes 
blurred.”31 
B. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Ultimately, Vietnam’s approach to surveillance and reporting during SARS, H5N1, 
H1N1, and COVID-19 may be unsurprising given the dramatic change and significant 
development that the country has undergone over the last three decades. As the literature 
review has demonstrated, varying arguments have already been made attempting to 
account for Vietnam’s emerging infectious disease surveillance and reporting. Existing 
academic literature is, however, largely limited to international theory concepts such as 
norms and domestic politics, providing an arguably incomplete explanation which does not 
 
28 Vu, 119–120. 
29 Curley and Herington, 162. 
30 Curley and Herington, 165. 
31 Keohane and Nye, 20. 
10 
consider the complexity of interdependent international relationships in a globalized world. 
Furthermore, existing research is generally constrained to discrete studies of specific 
disease outbreaks rather than a side-by-side comparison of a succession of responses 
allowing for the analysis of similarities and contrasts across cases amid broader changes 
over time.  
This thesis seeks to assist in bridging this academic gap by providing an assessment 
of whether a foreign policy paradigm shift based on complex interdependence serves as an 
explanation for the country’s transparent and cooperative approach to surveillance and 
reporting. Such an investigation holds the potential to yield a more complete answer of 
why Vietnam has pursued a given set of behaviors with the international community during 
periods of emerging infectious disease outbreaks over the last two decades. In this case, 
what matters is not the label associated with the country’s form of government but rather 
the broader principles on which it has chosen to engage with the world with. Based on this 
hypothesis, it would be expected that Vietnam’s increasing adoption of the internationally 
enmeshing tenets of complex interdependence would be manifested in a more participatory 
approach to emerging infectious disease surveillance and reporting.  
To test this hypothesis, the thesis will be organized into five succeeding chapters. 
Chapters II through IV will provide successive detailed accounts of Vietnam’s surveillance 
and reporting behavior during the SARS, H5N1, H1N1, and COVID-19 outbreaks. In each 
of these cases, contributing factors to this response and any policy decisions aligning with 
or deviating from the tenets of complex interdependence will be discussed. Any notable 
deviations in Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting response as well as follow-on policy 
actions will also be highlighted. Chapter VI will assess these events in summation and 
provide an overarching evaluation for the ability of complex interdependency to account 
for these actions. Other paradigms identified in the literature review, if applicable, that 
serve as either more convincing or supplementary explanations will also be identified.  
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II. SARS: THE INITIAL MANIFESTATION 
OF GLOBAL INTEGRATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
SARS was chronologically the earliest of the four emerging infectious disease cases 
examined during this thesis. Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting approach during the 
SARS outbreak in 2003 was marked by an effort defined, from start to finish, by the direct 
participation of international organizations such as the WHO.32 During this outbreak, 
Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting superseded a simple willingness to share information. 
Rather, the country’s overall response was largely conducted under the guidance and 
material assistance of the WHO and other international health organizations and agencies, 
including the U.S. CDC.33 Overall, the transparency of Vietnam’s surveillance and 
reporting mechanism during SARS shows consistency with the tenets of complex 
interdependence in accounting for this behavior.  
B. BACKGROUND 
SARS arrived in Vietnam in late February 2003 when an American businessman 
fell ill at the private Hanoi French Hospital after contracting the still-unidentified disease 
during a brief stay in Hong Kong.34 A WHO epidemiologist in Hanoi was the first medical 
professional to diagnose the illness as a new disease syndrome as it began to rapidly spread 
to numerous staff members at the hospital.35 Following a meeting between in-country 
WHO personnel and the Vietnamese Ministry of Health (MOH) on March 9, 2003, the vice 
minister of health, Nguyen Van Thuong, agreed to a number of WHO recommendations to 
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counter the potential health crisis.36 These measures included establishing a dedicated 
MOH task force and allowing an international team of experts to enter the country to gather 
data and provide technical assistance in responding to the emerging outbreak.37  
This decisive action produced swift results, and within days a dozen Western 
epidemiologists and pathologists arrived in Vietnam to help provide oversight of the 
country’s surveillance and reporting efforts.38 This hand-in-glove linkage between 
Vietnam’s SARS task force and WHO experts proved instrumental in rapidly curbing the 
domestic spread of the disease by facilitating material assistance and enabling critical 
surveillance and detection measures such as contact tracing. On April 28, 2003, the WHO 
announced that Vietnam had become the first country to successfully contain the epidemic 
after no new SARS cases were detected for 20 consecutive days.39 Ultimately, Vietnam 
recorded a total of 63 confirmed cases of SARS out of a worldwide total of more than 
8,400.40 Additionally, all of the country’s cases were directly traced back to the initial 
patient, further indicating the limited scope of the domestic outbreak.41 
International assistance proved to be a critical element in allowing Vietnam to limit 
its experience with SARS to a relatively brief albeit jarring episode. However, the 
information originating from inside Vietnam also played a role in initiating the global 
surveillance and response mechanisms employed to control further spread of the epidemic. 
Although SARS had been circulating in mainland China since as early as November 2002, 
limited and often piecemeal Chinese reporting, combined with the Chinese government’s 
rejection of WHO offers of assistance, hindered any coherent international effort to 
epidemiologically identity and track SARS until it began to spread internationally through 
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confirmed human cases in Hong Kong during the same month, exacerbated the initial 
difficulty in ascertaining and mapping SARS as a new emerging infectious disease.43 Thus, 
the outbreak in Vietnam became one of the initial points enabling the concerted collection 
and international analysis of epidemiological data related to the new disease.  
The WHO-coordinated Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) 
represented the functional surveillance mechanism enabling the dissemination of 
epidemiological data from Vietnamese SARS cases to the WHO Global Influenza 
Surveillance Network (GISN) and wider global medical community.44 Established in 1997 
and formalized in 2000, GOARN represented an international partnership of more than 120 
national-level health agencies; SARS was the first instance in which in the network 
identified and responded to an outbreak with rapid international spread.45 As an 
international clearing house for reports of suspected disease outbreaks, GOARN “linked 
some of the world’s best laboratory scientists, clinicians, and epidemiologists 
electronically, in virtual networks that provided rapid knowledge about the causative agent, 
mode of transmission, and other epidemiological features.”46 In this sense, active 
participation in the network also demonstrated a decidedly internationalized and open 
approach toward disease surveillance and reporting. 
Ultimately, GOARN collection of clinical and epidemiological information from 
Vietnam’s initial SARS patients provided network laboratories with some of the first 
samples used to definitively rule out existing influenza viruses as a causal agent.47 This 
information allowed the WHO to issue its first global alert on March 12, 2003, at which 
point SARS was named as a distinctive new virus and the coordinated global surveillance 
and response effort commenced.48 While Vietnam was not the sole country enabling the 
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flow of information which led to this critical milestone, its surveillance and reporting 
approach of partnering with entities such as GOARN were significant in accelerating 
global response to the emerging epidemic. Emerging infectious disease outcomes are 
ultimately not the focus of this study, but it is indeed worth noting that, as evidenced by 
the case of SARS in Vietnam, surveillance and detection approaches can and do have 
tangible effects at both a national and international level.  
C. A “NEW WORLD” VIEW: THE ROAD TO VIETNAM’S SARS 
RESPONSE 
The conditions enabling Vietnam’s internationalized surveillance and reporting and 
overall response to SARS in 2003 were arguably the longer-term output of pivotal foreign 
policy shifts which began occurring in the country more than a decade and a half earlier. 
During this period, the VCP faced a potentially existential crisis as “traditional sources of 
legitimacy had been exhausted by the 1980s” and the country faced economic crisis, 
protracted military conflict in Cambodia, and political isolation in the dwindling support 
and eventual collapse of its Soviet partner and associated Communist satellite network.49 
In response, in 1986 the VCP-led government announced the Doi Moi reforms, an 
economic restructuring aimed at transitioning Vietnam from a centrally planned economy 
to a “socialist-oriented market economy” predicated on export-led growth.50 As an 
enabling element of this economic reorientation, Vietnamese grand strategy moved toward 
international integration under the framework of the “New World Outlook.”51 This 
ideology, which was advanced by reformists within the VCP, “highlighted interdependence 
among states and internationalization of national life.”52  
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Throughout most of the 1990s, Vietnamese politics seesawed between intermittent 
periods of control by the integration-minded reformists and hardline ideologues advocating 
for an alliance with China in lieu of multilateral integration with “imperialist” powers.53 
Ultimately, this internal jockeying for power within the VCP produced a foreign policy 
resulting in a mix of both extremes as Vietnam became enmeshed with both China and a 
wide range of other international partners and organizations.54 In less than a decade, 
Vietnam achieved a peaceful conclusion to its military involvement in Cambodia, 
normalized diplomatic and trade relations with both China and the U.S., joined ASEAN, 
and achieved observer status in the WTO.55 These developments represented only a few 
of the dozens of milestones transforming the country from failing Cold War Communist 
hold-out to developing and diversely enmeshed international actor during the 1990s and 
early 2000s. 
In the years leading up to the SARS outbreak, Vietnam’s participation and 
engagement in international health organizations and biosecurity initiatives deepened in 
parallel with its increasingly complex and interwoven involvement with the global 
community. Granted, Vietnam’s relationship with the WHO was not necessarily new, as 
the country technically joined in 1950 and the first WHO field office was established in 
Hanoi in 1977.56 Still, Vietnam’s decision to join multiple emerging global, regional, and 
subregional organizations dedicated to disease-related information sharing represented a 
tangible increase in the number of channels linking its health-sector entities to a broader 
international network. Furthermore, in the years leading up to the SARS outbreak in 2003, 
the country began recognizing the imperative of responding to disease outbreaks in a more 
multilateral fashion, such as during 1999 cholera outbreak along the Vietnam-Cambodia 
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border which resulted in 874 cases and 56 deaths.57 The cross-border nature of this event 
ultimately led to the assessment that future epidemics could be better contained “if 
Cambodian and Vietnamese epidemiologists and officials worked together.”58 
Partly as a result of this cholera outbreak, Vietnam became a founding member of 
the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance (MBDS) network, which was formally created in 
2001 by six countries with borders encompassing portions of the Mekong River.59 The 
MBDS was the output of a 1997 ASEAN-WHO memorandum of understanding 
highlighting the need for multilateral collaboration as a means of disease prevention and 
control.60 Although the MBDS operates on formal processes, it is ultimately driven by 
“informal trust-based relationships between MBDS member countries.”61 Thus, by the 
time SARS emerged in 2003, Vietnam had become tightly interwoven into what a global 
health regime based on the concept of information sharing as facet of interdependence as 
a means of detecting and curtailing the spread of infectious disease.  
D. THE MULTIPLE CHANNELS OF VIETNAM’S SURVEILLANCE AND 
REPORTING DURING SARS  
In elaborating on the tenets of complex interdependence, theorists Robert O. 
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye stress a paradigm in which “multiple channels connect 
societies,” including transnational organizations and informal ties among both 
governmental and nongovernmental elites.62 Arguably, Vietnam’s surveillance and 
reporting during the SARS episode reflects this concept, as the country’s overall foreign 
policy shift toward an approach of diverse international relationships during the preceding 
decade and a half became reflected in its emerging infectious disease response 
mechanisms. For example, the confirmation of Vietnam’s initial SARS patient illustrated 
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the ability of channels outside the traditional interstate domain to shape and essentially 
serve as the dominating force for policy decisions. In this instance, established 
relationships between doctors at the Hanoi French Hospital and in-country WHO team 
members represented the conduit by which epidemiological samples were forwarded to the 
U.S. CDC, collaborating labs in Japan, and the Vietnamese National Institute for Hygiene 
and Epidemiology (NIHE).63  
In assessing the explanation of complex interdependence for Vietnam’s behavior 
during SARS, this surveillance and reporting chain is noteworthy in that it functioned 
almost reflexively and without the involvement of the Vietnamese government. Indeed, 
this mechanism had been operating for more than a week before the key WHO-MOH 
meeting on March 9, 2003. The physical presence of GOARN-affiliated WHO 
epidemiologists linked into Vietnamese health entities and the global surveillance and 
reporting community created a dynamic in which multiple channels between international 
organizations and non-government entities complemented or perhaps even superseded 
traditional state actors in determining the given response. In essence, Vietnam pursued a 
transparent and cooperative surveillance and reporting strategy during SARS because its 
embrace of a broader foreign policy framed under international enmeshment contributed 
to the internationalization of this function. Zachary Abuza argues that Vietnam’s embrace 
of an interdependent world rendered its decision-making “no longer a state-centric 
system,” and the complex web of international relationships driving the country’s 
surveillance and reporting during SARS seems to support this assessment.64 Even without 
such institutionalization, it still seems likely that the Vietnamese government would have 
pursued such an outward approach on a more improvisational level given the active 
measures that it still did take to incorporate international involvement in its SARS 
response.  
Although the Vietnamese government certainly still represented one of the channels 
connecting its SARS surveillance and reporting to the global community, it had effectively 
 
63 Nakashima. 
64 Abuza, 411. 
18 
already outsourced the frontline elements of this function to non-government (and non-
Vietnamese) channels by the time the disease emerged in the country. It is worth noting 
that the WHO’s meeting with the MOH effectively amounted to a discussion on the 
former’s findings and recommendations rather than an attempt to obtain baseline 
information restricted through domestic channels. While there was some level of initial 
disagreement between the WHO and MOH, this was materially driven by differing 
interpretations of the nature and severity of the emerging SARS outbreak rather than a lack 
of transparency or unwillingness to share information.65 As the following section will 
discuss, this collaborative approach to disease response differed sharply with China, the 
country generally identified as the most egregious defector from timely and transparent 
reporting during the SARS epidemic.  
E. THE CHINESE COUNTERPOINT TO VIETNAM’S SURVEILLANCE 
AND REPORTING  
In contrast to Vietnam, where GOARN-affiliated WHO epidemiologists effectively 
represented a de facto leading element of the country’s real time surveillance and reporting, 
it was not until months into the epidemic that the Chinese government began officially 
reporting cases to the WHO despite the presence of WHO field offices in Beijing.66 
Ultimately, Chinese government attempts to suppress information about its growing SARS 
epidemic “did not succeed, as news of the outbreak leaked out through the Internet, e-mail, 
mobile phone text messaging, and the local Chinese media.”67 Even once China moved 
past its policy of official denial around mid-February 2003, the pattern of a lack of 
transparency continued with “the Chinese attempt to hide SARS patients from WHO 
personnel visiting Beijing hospitals to assess the real level of infection in the capital.”68  
David Fidler writes that “China’s mishandling of SARS demonstrated that it had 
still not grasped the new context for public health governance—epidemiological 
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information about germs does not recognize borders.”69 Although it can be argued with a 
fair level of certainty that Vietnam had learned and applied this lesson by the time of SARS, 
factoring in the effects of a grand strategy shift reflecting the paradigm of complex 
interdependence helps explain why Vietnam performed so differently from a country with 
which it is sometimes compared in politically contemporary terms. As this chapter has 
illustrated, the differences were much more than a simple contrast between one 
authoritarian state choosing to report and another choosing to conceal. Indeed, given the 
fairly comparable government structures of the two countries and the fact that Vietnam’s 
path to export-led economic liberalization “in many ways parallels that of China,” the 
divergence between the two countries is even more striking.70 Indeed, the gulf between 
Vietnam and China’s surveillance and reporting during the SARS period was reflective of 
a much broader shift that had occurred in which the former country had already forfeited 
this aspect of independence and sovereignty during a shift in which it embraced policies 
based on a broader concept of international enmeshment. 
 
69 Fidler, 120. 
70 Dwight H. Perkins, East Asian Development: Foundations and Strategies (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 2013), 122. 
20 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
21 
III. H5N1: STRIKING DEVIATION OR 
SUSTAINED COOPERATION? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting during H5N1 was characterized by an early 
cover-up when the disease first emerged among chicken populations in 2003. The country’s 
approach to its first human cases in early 2004, however, reflected general consistency with 
the internationally supported surveillance and reporting mechanism employed during 
SARS. Overall, Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting during its years-long battle against 
H5N1 reflected a policy of transparency reinforced by the principles of complex 
interdependence driving its previous response to SARS. Additionally, Vietnam’s early 
defection from this policy can possibly be explained by the tenets of complex 
interdependence identifying issues arising from a world lacking a clearly defined hierarchy 
of issues. Namely, the MARD’s role in leading the H5N1 response may have led to a 
situation where the initial avian outbreak was viewed more through the lens of a domestic 
issue rather than the high priority, internationalized character of SARS as a threat to human 
health security. 
B. BACKGROUND 
H5N1 emerged as a major health security issue in Southeast Asia in late 2003, 
immediately on the heels of the region’s battle with SARS.71 By that point, however, H5N1 
had actually been present in the region for some time, with the first identified human 
population outbreak occurring in Hong Kong in 1997.72 Still, it overwhelmingly remained 
a disease transmitted among avian species such as chicken, ducks, geese, and wild birds.73 
Following the initial Hong Kong outbreak, the virus continued to evolve and briefly 
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reemerge in brief episodes among avian populations, including its first limited detection in 
Vietnam in 2001.74 After the February 2003 incident involving human H5N1 cases in Hong 
Kong, avian outbreaks were reported in South Korea, Japan, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand 
between November 2003 and January 2004, indicating a regional epidemic.75 
The presence of H5N1 in Vietnam was similarly reported in January 2004 after 
WHO epidemiologists confirmed human cases among patients at Vietnam’s National 
Pediatric Hospital in Hanoi.76 Official Vietnamese government acknowledgement of the 
virus occurred almost simultaneously when the MARD Deputy Minister admitted in an 
interview with Tuoi Tre journalists that tests in August 2003 had confirmed H5N1 as the 
cause of massive avian deaths earlier that summer.77 In a notable deviation from the 
transparency characterizing the SARS epidemic, the interview revealed that the 
Vietnamese government had effectively concealed its detection of H5N1 for more than 
four months following the August tests. Ultimately, the superseding emergence of human 
vice avian cases, combined with press scrutiny over the MARD’s initial avian response, 
generated official acknowledgment. 
After this early cover-up, however, Vietnam immediately pivoted to a decidedly 
internationalized policy of disease surveillance and reporting as it began a protracted effort 
to control the spread of H5N1 within its borders. In response to the initial detection of 
human H5N1 infections, additional WHO epidemiologists as well as a team from the U.S. 
CDC were permitted to enter the country and granted field-level access in investigating 
increasing numbers of human cases.78 Simultaneously, the Vietnamese government 
switched to “a narrative that emphasized Vietnam’s determination to fight avian influenza 
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and to cooperate with the international community” which accompanied the prime 
minister’s direction to end the epidemic by February 2004.”79  
In many respects, Vietnam’s struggle with H5N1 ultimately came to represent a 
significant contrast from the nature of its earlier decisiveness in containing SARS. Despite 
the initial bravado and optimism of the prime minister’s statements, Vietnam was never 
able to control its H5N1 outbreak in the expeditious manner which defined its battle against 
SARS. SARS effectively consisted of a single cluster of human cases, and while human 
cases of H5N1 occurred in a similarly isolated fashion, the disease achieved widespread 
transmission in Vietnamese poultry populations. Additionally, H5N1 in Vietnam occurred 
in multiple waves of human and avian population outbreaks extending into the second 
decade of the twenty-first century. In January 2005, Vietnam became the country most 
severely affected by H5N1 in terms of spread among its human population, and by 2010 it 
was one of only four countries in the world still experiencing human cases.80 All told, from 
2003 to 2014 Vietnam experienced a total of 125 human cases and 62 deaths, placing it 
squarely in the grouping of the top three nations most affected by H5N1 in this measure.81 
Although H5N1 resulted in low human caseloads due to its bird-to-human transmission 
pathway, it produced mortality rates exceeding 60% among human cases, demonstrating a 
high level of lethality.82 
Ultimately, the effects H5N1 had on the country’s poultry population proved to be 
the most calamitous and difficult aspect of the epidemic to counter. One of the reasons why 
the initial 2003–3004 outbreak proved difficult to stem was simply the lack of a relevant 
model for effective avian influenza control.83 Following this period, Vietnam struggled to 
contain five successive waves over the next four years by implementing varying policies 
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of avian culling, vaccination, and restructuring of the livestock sector.84 These actions led 
to the culling of millions of birds and created political conflict regarding compensation for 
poultry farmers.85 At the same time, response measures across succeeding H5N1 waves 
“bore the hallmarks of foreign advice and were funded in large part by donors.”86 
Despite the initial cover-up, Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting during its 
marathon battle against H5N1 demonstrated a general pattern of international cooperation 
and engagement. Indeed, lags in reporting during the early years of the epidemic were 
“generally seen as a capacity issue rather than as evidence of political interference or 
obfuscation.”87 At a critical juncture in June 2005, collaboration between the NIHE and a 
WHO fact-finding team helped to dispel fears that a mutation of the virus with higher 
human to human transmission (and pandemic potential) was emerging.88 In this instance, 
both the WHO team’s visit and the transfer of NIHE lab samples occurred at the direction 
of the Vietnamese deputy prime minister, allowing for independent verification of the 
suspected new strain of H5N1.89 Although this engagement occurred under terms of 
confidentiality among the WHO and Vietnamese government to avoid inciting potentially 
unnecessary panic, the WHO quickly released a report confirming that H5N1 had not 
undergone a mutation conducive to human to human transmission.90 
C. VIETNAM’S H5N1 COVER-UP AND THE HIERARCHY OF ISSUES 
Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting during H5N1, and specifically the cover-up 
during the latter portion of 2003, raises a few obvious questions. Perhaps most importantly, 
why would the country go, in a matter of a few short months, from the lauded level of 
transparency it demonstrated during SARS to an act of state concealment? The MARD’s 
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investigation and subsequent confirmation of H5N1 occurred quite literally on the heels of 
the conclusion of Vietnam’s SARS outbreak, so attributing this contrast to any larger shift 
in overall Vietnamese foreign policy or internal government changeover seems unlikely. 
What is noteworthy, however, is the difference in the agencies of the Vietnamese 
government leading the initial responses to SARS and H5N1. Unlike SARS, the MARD 
led Vietnam’s initial H5N1 surveillance effort during the 2003 cover-up phase.91 The 
MOH was appointed lead agency only after the January 2004 confirmation of human 
infections but once again was superseded by the more politically powerful MARD just a 
few short months later.92 For the remainder of the epidemic, the MARD largely remained 
the principal government actor in Vietnam’s H5N1 response, with exceptions such as the 
2005 pandemic preparedness plan produced at the request of the WHO and spearheaded 
by the MOH.93  
To a certain extent, H5N1 represented a different category of issue from SARS due 
to its relatively limited spread among human populations but massive impacts on the 
Vietnamese agricultural sector. Indeed, the MARD sub-agency that emerged as the focal 
point for the H5N1 response was the Department of Animal Health (DAH), further 
highlighting how differently this problem was viewed and handled when compared with 
SARS.94 Thus, Vietnam’s early defection from transparent H5N1 reporting may at least be 
partially explained by this key administrative difference combined with the nature of the 
MARD’s investigation into H5N1 as a disease outbreak among chicken populations. As a 
result, information remained in channels less permeated by a web of international actors 
and “no officials dared to mention the name of the virus” until the MARD minister had 
officially notified the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).95 By contrast, the 
surveillance and reporting chain related to the initial human H5N1 cases reflected a SARS-
like dynamic in which epidemiological information flowed to overseas labs from the web 
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of in-country WHO representatives and domestic health entities such as the NIHE and 
Hanoi Pediatric Hospital.96 
What then, does this essentially bifurcated result mean in examining complex 
interdependence as the cause for Vietnam’s cooperative and transparent surveillance and 
reporting? Although an explanation for the early H5N1 cover-up may seem problematic in 
the context of Vietnam’s behavior during SARS and the other emerging infectious disease 
outbreaks examined in this thesis, it is not necessarily inconsistent with the world of 
complex interdependence. Specifically, the concept of an absence of hierarchy among 
issues seems to at least partially account for Vietnam’s lack of transparency.97 Keohane 
and Nye write that in a world lacking a clear hierarchy of issues, “these issues are 
considered in several government departments (not just foreign offices), and at several 
levels. Inadequate policy coordination on these issues involves significant costs.”98  
The case of the early H5N1 cover-up seems to suggest that this type of dynamic 
was in play as the MARD and central government perceived the early outbreak of H5N1 
to be a domestic issue due to its primary impacts in the agricultural realm. In retrospect, it 
effectively fell into the same bracket of international health issues such as SARS even 
though no human cases had yet emerged. Once this correction was made, surveillance and 
reporting largely followed as the struggle to control avian outbreaks assumed a 
skyrocketing level of internationalization via material and technical assistance and 
collaboration. Thus, Vietnam’s defection from transparent surveillance and reporting 
during the early stage of H5N1 does not necessarily invalidate the argument for complex 
interdependence. Rather, it is more illustrative of the inherent problems that arise in a world 
in which relations are both driven by a wide variety of actors outside the traditional purview 
of the state as well as a dynamic in which the ability to discern the line between domestic 
and international issues is increasingly difficult. 
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D. OTHER H5N1 DEFECTORS AND THE FALLACY OF 
AUTHORITARIAN COVER-UP 
Further investigation also reveals that Vietnam was not the only country to defect 
from a policy of cooperative and transparent surveillance and reporting during H5N1. In 
addition to China, Vietnam’s at least nominally democratic neighbors Thailand and 
Indonesia also demonstrated one or more instances of cover-up or lack of cooperation in 
reporting H5N1 cases or providing epidemiological samples to the international 
community.99 The similarities between Vietnam and Thailand’s actions during the initial 
H5N1 wave are particularly striking: despite having laboratory confirmation of H5N1 
infections by late 2003, the Thai government attempted to conceal the outbreak for three 
months in an effort to protect its poultry and tourism industries.100 As outbreaks continued 
to increase and pressure from domestic and international elements demanded an 
acknowledgement and response to the growing problem, in January 2004 the Thai 
government finally relented and launched a nationwide H5N1 surveillance program.101 In 
the case of Indonesia, in 2006 the country stopped sharing H5N1 samples with GISN, citing 
an inequitable distribution to wealthier countries of vaccines and other benefits derived 
from such samples.102 
In comparing Vietnam’s overall surveillance and reporting with its two Southeast 
Asian neighbors, Sara E Davies, Adam Kamradt-Scott, and Simon Rushton characterize 
Vietnam as a state that “routinely reported” while Thailand’s actions are described as 
“erratic” and Indonesia is categorized as a country that “explicitly challenged their 
reporting obligations.”103 Together, the three countries suffered among the worst H5N1 
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outbreaks globally, and disputes regarding compensation for poultry farmers became 
domestic crises in each country.104 Vietnam faced an additional challenge as it was trying 
to enter the international poultry market as H5N1 emerged, and the disease represented a 
serious setback to these plans.105 Despite these commonalities and incentives for cover-
up, Vietnam has still been categorized as much more timely, cooperative, and transparent 
in its overall surveillance and reporting during H5N1.106 While the comparisons of these 
three countries during H5N1 is a topic worthy of its own body of research, one point 
relevant to this thesis seems clear: transparency, or lack thereof, cannot automatically be 
correlated to a given form of government or regime type in this example. If anything, 
similarity of interests or perception of the problem seems more determinant in accounting 
for periods when Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting reflected defections similar to those 
of Thailand or Indonesia. 
E. THE H5N1 ERA: THICKENING THE WEB OF VIETNAM’S 
ENMESHMENT 
Overall, Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting during the H5N1 period, with 
perhaps the exception of the initial cover-up, demonstrated a similar further intertwining 
of the country with the international community which had marked the decade and a half 
prior to the emergence of SARS. At a macro level, this reflected in the manner in which 
“Vietnamese policy-makers made considerable efforts to cooperate with donors on human 
health policies.”107 Much of this acceleration was based on Vietnam’s dependence on 
foreign assistance in countering successive H5N1 waves through resource and expertise 
intensive disease control measures. At the same time, international donors, organizations, 
and health agencies were driven to invest in the country in these efforts due to the pandemic 
threat posed by H5N1.108 Simply put, Vietnam needed the global community to help solve 
its H5N1 problem amid increased international recognition of the shared interests of 
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controlling such an outbreak lest it reach pandemic proportions. Unsurprisingly, many of 
the larger initiatives highlighted in the literature review, such as the adoption of IHR 2005 
and the creation of APSED and WPRO subdivisions, occurred in a timeframe in which 
H5N1 was ravaging Southeast Asia amid fears that it could and would achieve global 
spread. This dynamic does make a strong case for the existence and influence of some type 
of normative effect regarding the sharing of infectious-disease information. In the specific 
case of Vietnam, it also reflected both the output and necessity of further enmeshment into 











Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting during the H1N1 pandemic in 2009 closely 
adhered to international standards, including IHR 2005, which was still being implemented 
worldwide after its accelerated adoption during the H5N1 period. Additionally, although 
Vietnam instituted a rigorous surveillance program at international entry points, the 
country’s overall response demonstrated adherence to the WHO’s further emphasis on 
avoiding unnecessary travel restrictions and import bans. Overall, Vietnam’s behavior 
during this emerging infectious disease outbreak demonstrated a sustainment of the same 
transparent and internationally cooperative tenets observed during its previous battles 
against SARS and H5N1. Additionally, widespread international adherence to standards of 
timely and transparent surveillance and reporting during H1N1 supports the notion of the 
rise of an international regime regarding the necessity of information sharing as a necessary 
response to the globalized nature of emerging infectious disease outbreaks.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Unlike SARS and H5N1, and contrary to many predictions in the medical 
community, H1N1 initially emerged as an epidemic in North America rather than Asia.109 
After manifesting as a novel strain of a virus usually found in pigs, the disease achieved 
rapid regional and global spread from its suspected origins in La Gloria, Mexico, in March 
2009.110 This widespread transmission led the WHO to declare H1N1 a global pandemic 
on June 11, 2009, the first disease of the 21st century to achieve such a status.111 Like 
SARS, H1N1 arrived in Vietnam by way of international air travel: the country reported 
its first case on May 31, 2009, when a Vietnamese student returning from the United States 
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tested positive for the disease.112 Twelve days later, the first H1N1 case in the capital city 
of Hanoi was detected, and community transmission became apparent by mid-July.113 The 
country spent the remainder of the year responding to an outbreak that, while much more 
widespread, possessed none of the lethality that made SARS, and especially H5N1, so 
concerning. By the end of 2009, the MOH reported 53 deaths among a total of 11,104 
H1N1 cases.114 Past the pandemic stage, H1N1 continues to circulate in Vietnam as a 
seasonal influenza virus.115 
Vietnam’s initial surveillance and reporting measures were implemented more than 
a month prior to the detection of the country’s initial case and occurred essentially in 
lockstep with guidance issued by the WHO. On April 27, 2009, when the WHO raised their 
global pandemic alert level for H1N1 to Phase 4 (community-level outbreaks), the MOH 
implemented a disease surveillance regimen focused on arriving travelers at international 
airports.116 These measures included body temperature scans, questionnaire screenings, 
and in-hospital isolation and testing of suspected cases.117 Additionally, a domestic hotline 
was created which provided information about the new virus.118 In response to this 
mobilized approach, the WHO’s spokesperson in Hanoi praised the country’s health 
officials, noting that “given previous experiences dealing with both avian influenza and 
SARS, Vietnam already has many surveillance and early detection mechanisms in 
place.”119 
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Like H5N1, H1N1 also presented a potentially larger economic and agricultural 
issue due to its characteristics as a disease normally transmitted among swine populations. 
In a notable deviation from H5N1, however, the MOH constituted the lead Vietnamese 
government agency coordinating the country’s overall response to H1N1.120 Initially, the 
Vietnamese government expressed uncertainty about potentially banning pork imports but 
“subsequently opted not to provoke panic as they had in early 2004 during the avian 
influenza epidemic.”121 Instead of resorting to import bans or swine culling measures 
implemented in multiple countries, the Vietnamese government instead enlisted the media 
in a public awareness campaign to promote the safety of both imported and domestic 
pork.122 This information effort also highlighted simple safety measures enabling the safe 
handling and consumption of pork products.123 Ultimately, concerns over H1N1 spread 
among Vietnam’s swine population were likely at least somewhat warranted. For example, 
a multinational study conducted in late 2009 using swine samples from Vietnam’s Red 
River Delta suggested “extensive reverse-zoonotic transmission from humans to pigs with 
subsequent onward transmission within pig herds.”124  
C. THE H1N1 RESPONSE: RIDING THE WAVE OF INTERNATIONAL 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESPONSE 
By the time Vietnam began instituting measures to counter the anticipated arrival 
of H1N1 at its borders, the country had been continuously responding to some form of 
emerging infectious disease outbreak for more than six years since the emergence of SARS 
in 2003. As the previous chapters have illustrated, these response measures demonstrated 
significant levels of dependence on and integration with the international community. 
Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting strategy at the onset of H1N1 demonstrated the 
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sustainment of these characteristics; the country was both keen to implement guidelines 
from the WHO as well as dependent on medical technology provided from international 
sources. For example, the two facilities in Ho Chi Minh City capable of testing for H1N1 
consisted of the Pasteur Institute and the Hospital for Tropical Diseases (HTD).125 The 
technical means for this capability was provided by WHO/US CDC-developed tests, of 
which the Pasteur Institute and HTD received primers for in May 2009.126 From that point 
forward, the Pasteur Institute provided formal national diagnostic confirmation of cases 
while the HTD served as the main referral point for cases in the city.127 
Given the above chronological timeline, Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting 
during H1N1 should be assessed in the context of the late H5N1 period. Although H1N1 
did not emerge in the same narrow window as the intermission between SARS and H5N1, 
Vietnam’s prolonged battle against H5N1 was essentially still unfinished as H1N1 began 
emerging as a disease of pandemic proportions. Indeed, the country was still in the midst 
of pursuing a revamped avian vaccination program planned to last through 2009, 
illustrating the overlapping nature of H5N1 and H1N1 as potentially crisis-inducing health 
issues. In describing Vietnam’s behavior during H5N1, Annick Guénel and Sylvia 
Klingberg write that Vietnamese authorities “sought to carry out international biosecurity 
agencies’ recommendations to the letter. This strategy fitted with the country’s general 
politics of global market integration.”128 Given the nearly gapless chronological timeline 
between H1N1 and H5N1, the same policy seems to have carried over from the former to 
the latter. 
Thus, virtually all available evidence points to a policy of transparent and 
internationally cooperative surveillance and reporting during Vietnam’s initial and follow-
on response to H1N1. Additionally, such behavior demonstrates a sustainment of the 
patterns generally observed during the country’s previous experiences with SARS and 
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H1N1: integration with international health organizations through multiple channels, 
deliberate demonstrated compliance with guidelines promulgated from organizations such 
as the WHO, and a reliance on international expertise and material assistance in countering 
the spread of the disease. During H1N1, however, transparent and timely reporting was 
overwhelmingly the mean behavior of countries rather than the exception. Davies, 
Kamradt-Scott, and Rushton observe that “of those countries that possessed the technical 
capacity to detect and report outbreaks of the virus via public health infrastructure (such as 
influenza surveillance networks and the laboratory capacity necessary to isolate and 
identify influenza strain), very few failed to report transparently and openly.”129 Indeed, 
the high profile defections that marked SARS, and especially H5N1, were all but absent 
from the H1N1 period, with approximately 85 percent of countries adhering to WHO 
recommendations and guidelines.130  
Considering that timely and transparent reporting was essentially the norm during 
H1N1, the metric of cooperativeness can arguably be extended to how well a country also 
adhered to additional international standards of transparency and disease response 
promulgated within IHR 2005. Namely, the prohibition against arbitrary and unnecessary 
trade and travel restrictions outlined in the regulations effectively became the yardstick of 
a country’s international cooperativeness during the H1N1 pandemic. In assessing this 
measure, Davies, Kamradt-Scott, and Rushton point out that “approximately 35 of the 
WHO’s 196 member states (i.e., slightly over 15 percent) did impose international trade 
and travel restrictions that seemed to contravene the behavioral expectations encapsulated 
in the IHR (2005).”131 As noted earlier in the chapter, Vietnam was not one of the countries 
to defect from these standards and refrained from instituting pork bans, travel restrictions, 
or other similar measures contravening expected international intercourse in the pandemic 
environment of H1N1.132 Rather, the country’s surveillance measures and public 
awareness campaign were implemented to both functionally stem the spread of the disease 
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while remaining within the bracket of agreed-upon international health regulations. In 
considering this behavior as a tangential measure of a country’s transparency and 
cooperativeness during H1N1, Vietnam still falls into the grouping of countries 
demonstrating a broader adherence to internationally compliant disease response measures.  
D. VIETNAM’S SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING DURING H1N1: 
SIMPLY FOLLOWING THE NORM? 
What, then, does Vietnam’s behavior during H1N1 mean for the examination of 
complex interdependence as a driver for the country’s seemingly unexceptional approach 
to surveillance and reporting? First, although the more widespread transparency of 
reporting during H1N1 does support the argument of norms in general and the importance 
of reforms such as IHR 2005 in particular, such a dynamic is not mutually exclusive of the 
world of complex interdependence. Instead, the international regimes identified by 
Keohane and Nye provide a more comprehensive explanation for why transparent 
surveillance and reporting, and a broader adherence to international health regulations, 
became widespread by the time of H1N1.133 The gradual movement toward a global health 
regime emphasizing information sharing had its roots in the late twentieth century before 
being strengthened by the onslaught of a rapid succession of emerging infectious diseases 
such as SARS and H5N1 during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Thus, while 
norms do have a degree of explanatory power, the argument for the broader emergence of 
a global health regime arguably provides a more comprehensive explanation for the 
broader state of surveillance and reporting during H1N1. 
Second, the international enmeshment which by 2009 characterized nearly two 
decades of Vietnamese foreign policy continued virtually unabated during the H1N1 period 
and the lead up to it. Although the Global Financial Crisis represented the larger (and 
arguably more challenging) international event occurring in the background of the H1N1 
outbreak, 2009 still represented yet another noteworthy year furthering the country’s 
economic and political integration into the global community. For example, Vietnam 
achieved non-permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council and was in the middle 
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of negotiations for a free trade agreement with the European Union during the same period 
it was responding to the latter stages of H5N1 and the H1N1 pandemic.134  
Given this continued pattern of deepening involvement with a variety of 
international actors, the role of regional organizations highlighted in the literature review, 
namely APSED, can also be put into better context as an element under the broader 
umbrella of complex interdependence. In her book Containing Contagion: The Politics of 
Disease Outbreaks in Southeast Asia, Sara E. Davies argues that “in the case of APSED, 
regional institutions played a vital two-step role in merging the WHO goal of IHR 
compliance with states’ interest in strengthening core capacities such as surveillance and 
response operations for the novel outbreaks and endemic diseases.”135 APSED, with its 
backing provided by the inherent informal networking of ASEAN membership, arguably 
provided overlapping layers of relationships reinforcing the migration toward a standard 
of more transparent surveillance and reporting. APSED played a role in propagating the 
IHR 2005-articulated norm for surveillance and reporting as part of an international health 
security regime, but it was the multiples channels of relationships underpinning it that also 
need to be recognized.  
Given Vietnam’s previous proclivity for this type of action, combined with its 
multitude of relationships anchored by ASEAN membership, the effects of APSED were 
ultimately more reinforcing rather than transformational in the country’s surveillance and 
reporting during H1N1. Within the timeframe of this pandemic, Vietnam was actually 
preparing to assume the position of ASEAN chair in 2010, further representative of its 
policy of being “actively involved in ASEAN and in ASEAN’s relations with other 
countries.”136 While H1N1 may be more notable for its globally broader adherence to 
transparency in surveillance and reporting, in Vietnam’s case it also accompanied the 
perpetuation of an increasingly complex and enmeshed relationship with the international 
community. 
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V. COVID-19: BUILDING INTERNATIONAL STANDING 
THROUGH SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Vietnam’s response to COVID-19 has received significant international recognition 
for its overall effectiveness in stemming the spread of the disease within the country’s 
borders. Despite reporting some of the lowest COVID-19 caseloads and deaths in the 
world, virtually all assessments indicate that the country has pursued a policy of 
transparency in its surveillance and reporting of COVID-19 cases. Additionally, Vietnam 
has deepened the nature of its enmeshment in the global health regime by emerging as a 
“provider” of surveillance capacity during the pandemic through measures including the 
development and export of COVID-19 test kits. Furthermore, the Vietnamese government 
has explicitly made transparency a deliberate element of its domestic communication 
campaign in an effort to leverage the pandemic to enhance its international standing and 
domestic legitimacy.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Vietnam confirmed its first COVID-19 case on January 23, 2020, making it one of 
the first ten countries to officially detect the emerging pandemic within its borders.137 Like 
SARS and H1N1, COVID-19 was introduced into Vietnam by international air travel. In 
the case of COVID-19, travelers flying to Hanoi from the emerging virus epicenter of 
Wuhan, China represented Vietnam’s first cases, and within two weeks the country 
accounted for 7% of the confirmed global caseload.138 Despite this alarming start, within 
a year Vietnam had garnered international attention and praise for its ability to prevent the 
spread of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the country “ranked among the five 
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countries with the lowest COVID-19 disease burden, and among the three countries with 
lowest overall mortality.”139 
As with H1N1, planning for COVID-19 response measures had been occurring for 
more than a month prior to the confirmation of Vietnam’s initial case. Beginning in 
December 2019, the MOH published seven legal documents outlining the country’s 
response plan for the anticipated spread of the still murky influenza rapidly spreading in 
neighboring China, and medical screenings at border crossings were implemented in mid-
January.140 Within a week of the first case, the Taskforce Group on COVID-19 prevention 
and control was formed under the leadership of Vice Prime Minister Vu Duc Dam.141 This 
group, consisting of representatives from 23 ministries, press organizations, and other 
organs of state, was formed to issue directives and decisions aimed at preventing the spread 
of COVID-19 at the national, provincial, and local levels.142 Early measures, which 
included border closures, health declarations, and quarantine requirements, actually 
exceeded WHO recommendations and resulted in a rapid cessation of new cases for nearly 
two weeks by late February 2020.143 In a February 15 statement, the WHO praised 
Vietnam’s early mobilization for its emphasis on “early detection, early isolation, and 
active treatment,” echoing the organization’s assessment of the country’s proactive 
response to H1N1 more than a decade earlier.144 
The formation of the Taskforce Group embodied Vietnam’s “whole of 
government” strategy adopted to combat COVID-19, with much of this approach framed 
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in public messaging in the context of a nationwide wartime mobilization.145 As with earlier 
case studies, the core of the country’s strategy has still been government-led with 
considerable international collaboration. Domestically, information has been a cornerstone 
of Vietnam’s ongoing COVID-19 response, with an emphasis on leveraging advances in 
information technology to improve surveillance and reporting, including the extensive use 
of social media and smartphone technology.146 For instance, in March 2020 the MOH 
worked with domestic telecom companies to launch the app NCOVI, which essentially 
enabled neighborhood-level reporting and contracting tracing of detected cases and 
infection clusters.147 The MOH subsequently launched the app Bluezone the following 
month, which allowed users to identify instances of close contact with confirmed COVID-
19 patients.148 As an additional measure of its public information campaign, the MOH 
collaborated with the WHO in producing infographics regarding COVID-19 preventive 
measures during specific situations such as the use of public transportation.149 
International collaboration and technological innovation has also been a highlight 
of the country’s approach to improve its surveillance and reporting capability. In February 
2020, as Vietnam began to mobilize its COVID-19 response, the country still relied on a 
manual system of tracking and reporting suspected disease cases which included 
transcribing case details into a manual spreadsheet for greater dissemination within the 
MOH and regional public health institutes.150 Following an urgent request from the MOH 
to international partners to assist in developing an online system for real-time case tracking, 
the U.S. CDC and the international nonprofit health organization PATH collaborated with 
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the domestic telecommunications firm Viettel, producing an online reporting system in just 
nine days.151 This surveillance tool was subsequently integrated into daily MOH 
emergency operations center meetings and has been used to develop quarantine strategies 
over the course of the pandemic.152 
C. TRANSPARENCY AND THE CAPACITY BUILDING OF THE POST 
H1N1 ERA 
To date, Vietnam has been generally categorized as “one of the world’s star 
performers” in its COVID-19 response.153 Consequently, the newfound attention Vietnam 
has received in the press and academia has at times led to initial disbelief over the 
transparency and accuracy of its seemingly unbelievably low numbers of COVID-19 
caseloads and deaths.154 Yet, as Paul Schuler points out, “media outlets, international 
health organizations operating in Vietnam, and foreign experts formed a consensus early 
on that the numbers were correct.”155 For instance, the Oxford University Clinical 
Research Unit (OUCRU) conducted approximately 20,000 tests on site in Hanoi during the 
first half of 2020, with results matching the official data shared by the Vietnamese 
government.156 Although the debate is only beginning as to why Vietnam (and a few other 
Asian countries) have prevented the spread of COVID-19 to such an exceptional degree, 
there seems virtually no evidence to suggest that Vietnam’s reporting of COVID-19 cases 
has been a deviation from the transparency that has largely defined its emerging infectious 
disease responses during the last two decades. 
In addition to the more ad hoc technological tools created during the early stages of 
COVID-19, Vietnam’s surveillance measures unrolled at the onset of the pandemic 
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demonstrated a level of robustness which had matured significantly from the H1N1 era 
more than a decade earlier. As with much of the broader disease response capability 
developed during the intervening years between H1N1 and COVID-19, these advances 
were largely achieved in partnership with international actors, especially the U.S. CDC. 
For example, in 2013 Vietnam created a national emergency operations center and added 
multiple regional hubs three years later.157 These sites serve both as hubs for domestic 
collaboration as well as a linkage back to the U.S. CDC in Atlanta.158 Furthermore, they 
are staffed with graduates of the MOH’s Field Epidemiology Training Program, a U.S. 
CDC and WHO-supported training curriculum that “trains disease detectives in the 
field.”159 Additionally, in 2016 Vietnam rolled out the pilot version of an “event based” 
surveillance program in collaboration with the U.S. CDC, expanding this initiative to the 
national level in 2018 due to its successful results.160 
These specific details were largely captured in Vietnam’s 2016 Joint Evaluation 
Exercise (JEE) conducted by the WHO. As previously highlighted in the literature review, 
the JEE assesses the capacity of a country’s surveillance mechanisms in accordance with 
the standards established in IHR 2005.161 Thus, Vietnam’s JEE was significant for a few 
reasons. First, it reflected the burgeoning emerging infectious disease surveillance and 
detection capacity mechanism that would be brought to bear against COVID-19 in early 
2020. In addition to the surveillance infrastructure improvements noted above, in the years 
immediately preceding COVID-19 Vietnam had exercised these capabilities during real 
world scenarios involving Ebola, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), and avian 
influenza H7N9.162  
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Second, as a voluntary external assessment, submitting to a JEE inherently suggests 
both at least some level of transparency as well as a determination to demonstrate 
compliance with the international readiness standards established by IHR 2005. Indeed, 
Vietnam was only the second country in the WHO WPRO subdivision to receive a JEE, 
and in the report the WHO’s assessment team noted that “through the whole process of the 
JEE and the in-country mission, high political commitment was evident.”163 Although 
Vietnam certainly improved upon its domestic emerging infectious disease surveillance 
capabilities during the decade between H1N1 and COVID-19, the theme of deliberate 
international involvement and adherence to international regulations also remained 
consistent, if not actually increasing.  
On one hand, then, the JEE may represent the further maturation of the normative 
effects on IHR 2005 discussed in the previous chapter. At the same time, however, it also 
represents the continued enmeshment of Vietnam into international health relationships 
overlapping the architecture of these regulations and its reinforcing organizations. Indeed, 
many of the JEE-identified capacity improvements resulting from Vietnam’s partnership 
with the U.S. CDC were facilitated under the auspices of the Global Health Security 
Agenda (GHSA), which was initiated in 2014 “as a global effort to strengthen the world’s 
ability to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats.”164 As a US-backed 
initiative, the GHSA has to date been joined by 67 countries, with Vietnam representing 
one of its first signatories in 2014.165  
D. THE TWO-WAY STREET OF COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE 
Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting during COVID-19, when compared to the 
other emerging infectious disease outbreaks examined in this thesis, is notable in the 
country’s ability to leverage domestic capabilities and innovation in a manner that was 
absent (and unavailable) during earlier responses. For example, although Vietnam 
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launched its surveillance efforts by utilizing South Korean test kits and relying on bilateral 
research efforts with Japan, in late January 2020 domestic efforts to develop diagnostic 
tests had commenced. Over the next month, Vietnamese medical researchers developed 
several low-cost tests kits.166 This effort was supported by a combination of material 
support from the WHO as well as adapting tests kits under already developed by the U.S. 
CDC and WHO.167 Ironically, despite the sustained international groundwork that had 
contributed toward achieving this level of capability, by early March 2020 Vietnam had 
developed three effective COVID-19 tests at a time when there were still none readily 
available in the US.168  
Interestingly, there is also evidence to suggest that Vietnam has attempted to 
leverage these improved capabilities in the foreign policy realm. For example, one of the 
first indigenously produced COVID-19 tests, the Viet A, was quickly certified by the 
European Union and ultimately endorsed by the WHO in April 2020 under an emergency 
use listing procedure.169 Such approvals paved the way for large-scale exports of 
Vietnamese COVID-19 tests, and by the time the Viet A received WHO approval Vietnam 
was already finalizing arrangements with 20 countries for large-scale purchase of the 
tests.170 Vietnam also donated hundreds of thousands of masks and associated equipment 
to the U.S. and Japan as the Viet A test was receiving WHO approval in April 2020.171 
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Thus, COVID-19 has arguably advanced the web of the country’s health security 
relationships into a sort of two way street in which information transparency is no longer 
the sole good being conveyed in exchange for technical and material assistance. When 
compared to Vietnam’s overwhelming dependency on either internationally sourced tests 
(such as H1N1) or international agencies to assist in the testing (SARS and H5N1), the 
maturation of indigenous Vietnamese emerging infectious diseases surveillance capacity 
bolstered by international relationships during COVID-19 is significant. While still 
displaying characteristic international collaboration seen during previous outbreaks, during 
COVID-19 the country has become an exporter of capacity as a means of reinforcing 
international relationships and demonstrating its standing in the global community.  
E. TRANSPARENCY AS A SOURCE OF PERFORMANCE LEGITIMACY 
Building on previous emerging infectious disease outbreaks, the VCP has arguably 
leveraged COVID-19 to transform the pandemic from a potentially disastrous calamity into 
an opportunity to strengthen its legitimacy both at home and abroad. For example, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute analyst Huong Le Thu argues that “COVID-19 could 
have curtailed Hanoi’s foreign policy agenda and undermined its security, but the pandemic 
thus far has only strengthened Vietnam’s international positioning and reputation, and 
boosted public confidence in the government.”172 Aside from its international surveillance 
and reporting, the Vietnamese government has also made an effort to highlight domestic 
transparency as a key tenet of this strategy. Beginning in the early stages of the pandemic, 
official newspapers, government websites, and television broadcasts delivered continuous 
updates on COVID-19 cases both domestically and abroad; they also delivered MOH 
health messages aimed at preventing additional infections.173 Although the VCP has 
continued to otherwise maintain pressure on dissidents and other protesters throughout the 
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same period, “transparent information on positive cases helped to convey the image of 
government action toward COVID-19.”174 
Thus, not unlike previous emerging infectious disease outbreaks such as H5N1 and 
H1N1, Vietnam’s overall reporting and surveillance behavior during COVID-19 appears 
to at least be driven in part by the concept of domestic considerations identified in the 
literature review of this thesis. Yet, in the case of COVID-19 there appears to be little of 
the failure to discern the blurring “distinction between domestic and foreign issues” that 
plagued Vietnam’s early response to H5N1.175 Rather, Vietnam’s overall surveillance and 
reporting seems to suggest that the VCP has managed to leverage this dynamic to its 
advantage both at home and abroad by leveraging the transparency, capacity, and overall 
effectiveness of this effort. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING IN REVIEW: AN OUTPUT OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENMESHMENT 
During the last thirty-five years, Vietnam has gone from being effectively a pariah 
nation to a highly integrated regional and global actor. The policy of Doi Moi economic 
renovation, initiated in the late 1980s, has proven to be a watershed catalyst for this 
evolution, with far reaching impacts in virtually every aspect of Vietnam’s society, political 
economy, and foreign policy. As part of the Doi Moi reforms, Vietnam dramatically shifted 
from a centrally planned to market-based, export-oriented economy and entered into 
multiple bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.176 At the same time, the country took 
dramatic steps to reform its image of isolated Cold War belligerent by seeking engagement 
and membership in a litany of regional and international organizations. This overall trend 
of deepening international engagement has continued and accelerated into the first two 
decades of the twenty-first century with parallels in Vietnam’s growing partnership with 
international health organizations and agreements. Many of these initiatives are 
deliberately aimed at responding to infectious disease outbreaks in a multilaterally 
cooperative and transparent manner as well as providing international assistance to 
enhancing the surveillance capacity of developing nations. 
Across four major emerging infectious disease outbreaks spanning the first two 
decades of the twenty-first century, Vietnam has demonstrated a largely consistent 
approach to transparency in its international reporting. At the same time, it has benefitted 
from an increasing surveillance capacity enabled and intertwined with the assistance and 
direct involvement of health organizations from other countries and the global community 
at large. Indeed, there is a body of evidence to suggest that these changes have accompanied 
the emergence of norms and a global health security regime focused on shaping expected 
behaviors in surveillance and reporting. It is, however, ultimately the broader context of 
 
176 Ralf Emmers, “The Indochinese Enlargement of ASEAN: Security Expectations and Outcomes,” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 73. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1035771042000332057. 
50 
complex interdependence which accounts for why the VCP has bought into a policy which 
paradoxically seems to limit sovereign authority within their own borders. In the end, such 
an approach is both an output and a requirement of a broader strategy to deliberately 
enmesh the country internationally as a means of preserving regime survival. Given that 
prerogative, it is also worth remembering that engineering foreign policy based on a 
paradigm of complex interdependence still boils down to satisfying national interests. 
Former Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, one of the Vietnamese policymakers credited 
with introducing the New World Outlook in the 1980s, essentially recognized this dynamic 
in a position paper arguing that “Hanoi must interlock the diverse interests of different 
actors into situations that are favorable to Vietnam. Officials must even create new interests 
for the country’s opponents and then enmesh them in networks beneficial to it.”177 In the 
end, although the VCP has perhaps lost a bit of sovereignty in the internationalization of 
its infectious disease surveillance, it has gained significantly in materially increasing the 
country’s capacity and relationships by propagating the image of a responsible global actor.  
B. VIETNAM AND THE AUTHORITARIANISM (MIS)LABEL 
Perhaps one of the major takeaways of nearly two decades’ worth of Vietnam’s 
surveillance and reporting is also related to both the country’s unique form of governance 
and the broader characterization of authoritarianism in general. On one hand, the VCP has 
preserved a level of dominance and longevity surpassing that of many other authoritarian 
regimes, with scholar Jonathan London characterizing it as “an extraordinarily successful 
political party.”178 In his assessment, after more than eight decades of existence the VCP 
“shows no signs of relinquishing power and faces no organized opposition.”179 Indeed, 
“since 1975, after thirty years of war, people in Vietnam have largely lived in peace under 
a political system that in several respects has scarcely changed.”180 Consequently, the time 
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frame examined during the SARS, H5N1, H1N1, and COVID-19 outbreaks are somewhat 
unique among countries in that in the case of Vietnam they have been marked by the 
unbroken dominance of a single political party. Although much has changed, the stability 
of the VCP’s brand of intertwined authoritarianism has remained an arguably constant 
common denominator. 
At the same time, despite this broader continuity and stability, both Vietnam and 
the nature of the VCP’s rule underwent a major transition from the advent of Doi Moi to 
the 2003 emergence of SARS. This evolution, which has perpetuated into the current 
COVID-19 era alongside, has accompanied the VCP’s continued adaptation to internal 
party pressures and the demands of the international and domestic environment. As 
previous chapters have highlighted, the “party’s economic policies and their resultant 
economic institutions and institutionalized economic outcomes have structured interests 
and incentives within the Vietnamese Party state and Vietnamese social life more 
broadly.”181 Although VCP rule has certainly remained a constant factor during the last 
two decades of nearly continuous emerging infectious disease response, the gradual but 
sustained trend of restructuring the country “to link Vietnam’s economy to the global 
economy by taking advantage of Vietnam’s position in the global division of labor” has 
produced a form of authoritarian government which has evolved into a multi-positioned 
approach to international engagement.182 
Consequently, the tendency to simply apply an “authoritarian” label to Vietnam 
fails to account for the increasingly competitive complexity of the VCP’s rule wrought by 
the changes that the country has undergone since the mid-1980s. As Jonathan London 
points out, “unlike Singapore or China, a visitor to Viet Nam (and Ho Chi Minh City in 
particular) may well happen upon an open street protest. While the scale and frequency of 
these events should not be exaggerated, the very fact that they are allowed to occur 
indicates the nature of authoritarianism in Vietnam has its nuances.”183 At the same time, 
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it would also be misleading to try to overemphasize the amount of liberalization that the 
country has undergone or characterize the VCP’s rule as lacking the use of repression. 
Indeed, recent annual reports from organizations such as the U.S. State Department and 
Human Rights Watch still characterize the country as “extremely intolerant of political 
dissent.”184 Still, the classification of Vietnam along purely authoritarian lines is an 
oversimplification that fails to capture the underlying causes for intriguing and seemingly 
surprising behavior. Kerkvliet takes this line of argument one step further in his assertion 
that Vietnam is best categorized as a “responsive-repressive party-state” since frequently 
applied labels like authoritarian are problematic because “Vietnam under Communist Party 
rule has never conformed well to long-standing definitions for these terms.”185  
The conclusion more germane to this thesis is that it would be a mistake to simply 
lump Vietnam into such a broad bracket and base predictions on state behavior for disease 
surveillance and reporting from such an assessment. Arguably, this investigation has found 
evidence countering the purportedly authoritarian tendency to cover-up failures and 
propagandize successes. As previously highlighted, Vietnam has shown a notable 
divergence from the reporting practices of China, a country often identified as sharing 
many parallels in terms of political system and trajectory toward economic liberalization. 
During the four emerging infectious disease outbreaks examined, Vietnam was largely a 
transparent and timely reporter amid defections by authoritarian and non-authoritarian 
governments alike. Furthermore, the detailed examination of Vietnam’s performance as a 
generally transparent reporter amid a backdrop of dramatic integration into the global 
community has touchpoints into the line of academic work attempting to best characterize 
the highly complex nature (and byproducts) of the VCP’s rule.  
In the end, Vietnam’s transparent and internationally cooperative surveillance and 
reporting over the last two decades is largely unsurprising, regardless of its “authoritarian” 
government, given the deeply enmeshed relationships the country entered into prior to and 
during this period. In explaining this behavior, what matters more is the litany of new non-
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state actors and relationships which have increasingly defined the country’s interactions 
with the global community as “the states’ reach into Vietnamese citizens’ lives has receded 
significantly.”186 Vietnam may indeed be authoritarian, but the label itself ultimately 
connotes relatively limited meaning as a determinant of how reliably it can be expected to 
report transparently, or respond effectively, to an emerging infectious disease outbreak. 
C. COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE AND BLENDED FOREIGN POLICY 
Ultimately, then, how well does complex interdependence explain Vietnam’s 
surveillance and reporting across four major emerging infectious disease outbreaks over 
the last two decades? In general, the case studies of Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting 
during SARS, H5N1, H1N1, and COVID-19 seem to support the notion that Vietnam’s 
deliberate foreign policy orientation of enmeshment has at least accompanied the growth 
of diverse international relationships conducive to the sharing of information during 
emerging infectious disease outbreaks. Although these relationships were bolstered by the 
emergence or reinforcement of a global health regime emphasizing information sharing 
during such an event, the decision to position the country along such lines was still a 
deliberate one. Thus, the nature of Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting during the last two 
decades aligns with many of the tenets of complex interdependence. 
At the same time, the findings of this thesis do not argue that complex 
interdependence should necessarily serve as some sort of part and parcel replacement for 
the previously established explanations accounting for Vietnam’s surveillance and 
reporting. Rather, it serves as an additional framework which is actually rather 
complementary of much of the academic work discussed in the literature. For instance, 
complex interdependence does not necessarily discount the importance of ASEAN in 
advancing the norm of transparency during outbreaks. Indeed, Keohane and Nye 
specifically identify ASEAN as an example of regional interdependence.187 Rather, 
complex interdependence helps to explain the linkage of how Vietnam’s larger, 
economically motivated buy-in into such a worldview has supported both a deliberate 
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commitment to adherence to international norms and expectations of surveillance and 
reporting while producing a surveillance and reporting mechanism defined beyond the 
traditional relationships and authority of the state. 
Furthermore, complex interdependence should potentially be considered as part of 
the explanation for Vietnam’s surveillance and reporting rather than the sole independent 
variable. In describing Vietnam’s changing policy toward China during the 1990s and early 
2003, Alexander L. Vuving argues that this foreign policy shift represents an amalgamation 
of four paradigms—realism, complex interdependence, socialist internationalism, and 
asymmetry.188 Although Vuving acknowledges the role of complex interdependence as 
part of the explanation for why Vietnam pursued a rapproachement with China during this 
period, he argues that this “four-way” mixture more accurately captures the imperatives 
advanced by the two broad integrationist and anti-imperialist camps of Vietnamese 
policymakers.189 Although not explicitly stated, such a concept also implies the 
importance of domestic politics given that internal VCP politics ultimately drive this 
hybrid, at times schizophrenic worldview. 
Transferring Vuving’s multi-faceted concept to the realm of surveillance and 
reporting perhaps provides an even more comprehensive explanation for this behavior, 
especially in accounting for Vietnam’s defection from transparency during H5N1. 
Although a policy driven by a worldview of complex interdependence may explain the 
country’s internationalized disease surveillance capacity and willingness to report, it does 
not necessarily account well for the instances where a deviation has taken place (although 
the failure to discern the blurred line between domestic and international issues does offer 
one possibility). Rather, the presence and validity of additional paradigms may offer an 
even better alternative. For instance, in characterizing Vietnam and Indonesia’s H5N1 
defections from international transparency and cooperativeness, Curley and Herington 
argue that disease securitization actually “encouraged the prioritisation of domestic 
 
188 Vuving, 806. 
189 Vuving, 821. 
55 
political concerns and reinforced realpolitik in international engagements on global health 
issues.”190  
In the same manner that norms provide a necessary but not sufficient explanation 
for why Vietnam has generally been transparent, the presence of additional paradigms 
possibly accounts more convincingly for the forces at play during the instances when the 
country has deviated from such behavior. Even Keohane and Nye make the assessment that 
“complex interdependence sometimes comes closer to reality than does realism,” 
acknowledging that ultimately it and all other paradigms are an attempt to model reality 
rather than a prescriptively exclusive formula.191  
D. IMPLICATIONS: SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING IN A 
GLOBALIZED WORLD 
In characterizing globalism, Keohane and Nye describe one of its subsets as 
environmental globalism, a concept constituted by the “long-distance transport of materials 
in the atmosphere or oceans, or of biological substances such as pathogens or genetic 
materials, that affect human health and well-being.”192 Thus, the world of contemporary 
emerging infectious disease spread and response is itself representative of the globalist 
world “involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances” which, 
among other items, is linked through the flows of environmentally and biologically relevant 
substances.193 Indeed, in providing an example of environmental globalism, Keohane and 
Nye cite the worldwide spread of the AIDS virus from central Africa beginning at the end 
of the 1970s.194  
Given this context, if Vietnam’s story is one of a country deliberately enmeshing 
itself into the world of globalism over the last few decades, then the emerging infectious 
disease outbreaks examined in this thesis are arguably a small piece of the current state of 
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a world in which countries and people (and pathogens) are more closely interlinked through 
a wider variety of means than at any point in history. Certainly, infectious diseases and 
their spread are an age- old problem, and Keohane and Nye assert that globalism itself “is 
not new.”195 Their ability to quickly achieve far-reaching spread through historically 
unparalleled physical networks is, however, makes them such a uniquely pressing issue in 
the contemporary environment. It is not an insignificant anecdote that three out of the four 
emerging infectious diseases examined in this thesis arrived in Vietnam via international 
air travel. In such an interconnected world, surveillance and reporting takes on a new level 
of significance given the heightened probability that emerging infectious diseases will be 
difficult, if not impossible, to contain within the domestic borders of its originating country. 
Arguably, the nature of twenty-first century emerging infectious disease response itself 
perhaps makes the best case for complex interdependence given the importance of channels 
of international information sharing required to enact meaningful response measures, even 
if only at the domestic level. 
Considering the nearly overlapping progression of twenty-first century emerging 
infectious disease outbreaks culminating with the still ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the 
issue of surveillance and reporting expectations and responses in an environmentally 
interdependent world is unlikely to recede in importance in the near term; the scrutiny 
given to this issue will likely only increase in the drawn-out pandemic post-mortem of the 
coming years. While the endgame for COVID-19 is still some ways off as well, the 
considerable attention Vietnam has garnered for its exceptionally effectiveness response 
will also likely make it the subject of considerable future academic investigation. This 
thesis has attempted to contribute to this dialogue in building upon previous work 
examining the cause behind the country’s behavior as a largely consistent adherent to 
transparency and international standards in its surveillance and reporting during the last 
two decades. While complex interdependence may ultimately not provide a completely 
authoritative or even groundbreaking explanation in explaining why Vietnam’s actions in 
this realm seem at first glance to defy stereotypical expectations, the paradigm does provide 
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a better understanding of some of the indirect effects that deliberate enmeshment into the 
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